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Rites of passage?
Abstract
As legal discourse and legislation in Australia remains solidly weighted with representations of
Indigenous subordination, I want to look closely at how the binary of recogniser/recognisee continues to
operate using homogenous notions of national sovereignty and indigeneity. The assumption of a fixed
foundation for the nation of Australia was grounded with sovereign legislation, ensuring its continuance
with British law. In The Sovereign Event in a Nation’s Law, Motha (2003) points to the doctrine of tenure
operating in the form of a ‘skeletal principle’ that enables the sovereign body to extend its expanding laws
over a differing topography in order to preserve its sovereignty. Motha argues that the sovereign event is
not unitary but split from the outset.
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Assumed foundations
As legal discourse and legislation in Australia remains solidly weighted
with representations of Indigenous subordination, I want to look closely
at how the binary of recogniser/recognisee continues to operate using
homogenous notions of national sovereignty and indigeneity.
The assumption of a fixed foundation for the nation of Australia
was grounded with sovereign legislation, ensuring its continuance with
British law. In The Sovereign Event in a Nation’s Law, Motha (2003)
points to the doctrine of tenure operating in the form of a ‘skeletal
principle’ that enables the sovereign body to extend its expanding laws
over a differing topography in order to preserve its sovereignty. Motha
argues that the sovereign event is not unitary but split from the outset.
Following post-structural ethics, this irruption is due to an originary
relation of ethos that precedes and exceeds all relations. The originary
relation is constitutively iterative, that is, structured through a relation
of différance. This ongoing relation is irreducible. This means that
each individual’s relation with law is constitutionally different and is
therefore fundamentally incommensurable. Jean Luc Nancy sketched
this relation with law as ‘partage’, meaning both a partition and a
partaking. The structure of iteration implies both identity and difference.
A community is constitutionally founded in its fundamental divisions.
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Collectively, this engenders responsibility to allow for the fundamental
differences that paradoxically divide and join individuals. It is through
the relational differences that lives are shared meaningfully. Meaning
is a sharing of limits, where sense opens iteratively (Nancy 1997: 545).
From Australia’s colonial foundation, a claim of ‘equality for all’
determines that rights can only be recognised as the ‘same’ under one
over-arching sovereign law. The particularity of Indigenous difference
threatens this conception and so reinforces the binary of dominant
recogniser to subordinate recognisee. While the landmark Mabo case
revealed the indeterminacy of the colonial sovereign foundation, with
the recognition that the Indigenous peoples had their own relation to
law prior to settlement, cases on native title have nonetheless continued
to determine Indigenous law as subordinate in relation to Australian
common law.
I want to sketch now these common law legislations as illustrations
of Hegelian dialectical resolutions, which continue to recognise the
Indigenous as subordinated ‘other’ in the presumption of an Australian
sovereignty. The consolidation of Hegelian sovereignty relies upon
binarised difference, which is either denied, and covered over, or
recognised as subordinately ‘other’. My aim in sketching these
sovereign/slave binaries within Australian sovereign legislation is not
to normalise the theory of oppressed indigenous object versus active
sovereign subject, and so reinforce this Hegelian economy of
recognition, but to draw attention to how these assumptions of fixed
and binarised identities, be they national or individual, continue to have
purchase regarding material effects and lived consequences through
Australian law.
In Writing and Difference Derrida (1998) describes the Hegelian
sovereign’s determinations as caught in a closed circularity of selfreference. Meaning and value circulates in a restricted economy as the
naïve consciousness, so in the passage of one self-referential
determination to the next, the Hegelian sovereign remains a prisoner
of this consciousness.
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Mastery, for Hegel, is the structural repression and mediation of
other, perceived as a threat to self. Following Derrida, this mastery
remains a servile dissymmetry. He writes:
For history — that is meaning — to form a continuous chain, to be woven,
the master must experience his truth ... and when servility becomes lordship,
it keeps within it a trace of its repressed origin, being consciousness within
itself ... it will enter into itself and change around into real and true
independence (Derrida 1998: 251-77).

In repressing the other, the sovereign privileges itself to ‘master’
independence, a privileging, or self-exception, that is, a dissymmetry.
This dissymmetry is a guise that assumes equivalence in relations that
remain asymmetric and incommensurable. What becomes repressed is
the trace of the other that fissures all relations. It is the paradoxical and
constituting movement of différance that radically differentiates and
yet communicatively joins all inter-subjective relations.
Yet in Hegelian resolutions, at the very moment of facing finitude,
at the very moment the sovereign has opportunity to discern its intersubjective relation with the other, the sovereign mediates this relation,
thinking to conserve its negation, in what Derrida, after Hegel, calls a
ruse of Reason (Derrida 1998: 107).
Hegel sees this epistemic limit and the opportunity to see beyond
the self arises, yet he utilises a form of power to counter the perceived
threat of otherness. In Hegel’s words:
Man’s individuality has also its beyond within it, can go beyond itself and
destroy itself. To counter this, Reason is for him a useful instrument for
keeping excess within bounds, or rather for preserving himself when he
oversteps his limit; for this is the power of consciousness (Hegel 1964:
342).

So, through a ‘power of consciousness’, the sovereign continues to
repress any threat to this idea of consolidated identity. This repression
is what Derrida, after Bataille, refers to as Hegel’s blind spot. It is this
blind spot, I argue, that appears to repeatedly operate in the selfreferential legislations that shore up a homogenous Australian

274

Rites of passage?

sovereignty against the presumed threat of Indigenous difference. The
rite of passage ensured through Hegelian self-referential privilege, is a
power relation of dominance that represses difference and overlooks
inter-subjective relations. Australian legislation, with its liberal claim
of equality for all, assumes a unified body of Australians within one
overarching sovereign law, yet, in its generalised application,
paradoxically produces a homogenous identity of subordinate
indigeneity, that is perpetually ‘other’ to this unity.
In Writing and Difference Derrida sketches the figure of Bataille’s
‘sovereign of nothing’ that brings Hegel’s sovereign of self-conscious
mastery into question. In the place of the ‘blind spot’ of Hegelian selfconscious determinations, he offers Bataille’s image of the ‘excoriated
eye’ that deconstructs the inner perception of the disembodied and
enlightened sovereign. Instead of the egoistic eye that seeks to know
and only sees its own illuminations while blocking the rest, Bataille’s
eye has spewed out its contents to uncover the absence at its core, in
the hollow where every vision originates. It is a revealing of the
irreducibility of meaning, and the irreducibility of vision at this fissure.
The fixed self transgresses its borders, rupturing the naïve and closed
circularity of self-consciousness. At this aporetic structure this seeing
doesn’t disconnect from dialectics but relates the restricted self to its
irrupted borders beyond sense. This relating is a movement intolerant
of the distinction between sovereign/slave, self/other. Bataille’s
‘sovereign of nothing’ transgresses determined meaning in this way,
causing a disjunction in the logic of the restricted passage of the same.

Assured legislations
The sketch of the skeletal body of law in the Mabo case reveals the
logic of Australian law. The doctrine of tenure can be understood as a
dissymmetrical circulation of common law assumptions, which, through
the ‘power of consciousness’, mediate any threat to the sovereign unified
body, thereby grounding and controlling a widening topology. Using a
binarised system of sovereign nation versus indigenous other, the
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doctrine of tenure continues to operate with subordinating determinism.
This dissymmetry of assumptions began at the foundation of Australian
sovereignty.
The Mabo judges found that Australian sovereignty was acquired
through occupation and settlement as the land was presumed to consist
of ‘a tract of territory practically unoccupied, without settled inhabitants
or settled law at the time when it was peacefully annexed to the British
dominions’ (Mabo v Queensland (No 2): 34-8). Colonial legislation
was influenced by the assumption in international law that nomadic
people, through their assumed failure to productively cultivate land,
demonstrated an incivility that justified European settlement by
occupancy (Castles 1982: Ch 1). In keeping with contemporary
international standards for the adequate accommodation of human
rights, the Mabo case rejected these assumptions and legally
acknowledged the Indigenous peoples’ pre-existing laws and
relationship with the land. The recognition of their pre-existing tenancy
at the foundation of sovereignty opened up the possibility for
responsible relations. In using tenancy here I mean to connote a
belonging rather than a possessing.
Yet Maaka and Fleras (Ivison Patton and Sanders 2000) argue that,
legislatively, Indigenous Australians have still not been afforded proper
accommodation of their own relations with law, and their relations with
the land remain derivative to colonialism. Irene Watson (2006) and
Judith Grbich (2001: 128) have highlighted that native title has engaged
a process of non-entitlement in Indigenous land relations. While the
Mabo case recognised the pre-existence of Indigenous laws at the
founding event, which revealed the indeterminacy of the fixed
foundation of Australian sovereign law, there has not been subsequent
unbinarised negotiations acknowledging responsible and co-existent
relations with Indigenous peoples. Rather, they have continued to be
binarised as subordinate recognisee in Mabo and subsequent native
title cases with classic dialectical mediation.
As Motha points out in the Mabo case regarding Indigenous title of
the Murray Islands, it was the separation of juridical and legislative
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power — that is, beneficial and radical title — into things-in-themselves,
that enabled the prerogative power of the Crown to take the outside of
law, in a mastering of otherness, without being checked by common
law. With the fiction of a fixed foundation in sovereign law revealed,
the common law ‘masterfully’ placed the unjustifiable sovereign event
outside law. The unified and settled territory of Australia was re-assumed
in a future anterior movement ensuring continuance with British colonial
sovereignty was re-established as juridical foundation, with common
law recognising Indigenous title only where it wasn’t extinguished by
the doctrine of tenure. The prerogative power of the Crown —
resonating with the Hegelian sovereign’s ‘power of consciousness’ —
was able to counter the threat of Indigenous title, in a resilient and
teleologically progressive determination that enabled the skeletal form
of the sovereign body of law to stay intact.
Despite the elaborate denunciatory lengths Michael Connor has
recently gone to in his attempt to display the term terra nullius as a
modern legal contrivance, it seems clear his concern is this
indeterminacy at the foundation of Australian sovereignty. Whether
the Mabo judges decided that it was terra nullius or annexation that
was to be overturned, what appears to remain unacceptable to Conner
at base is any recognition of Indigenous systems as evidence of preexisting law relations and pre-existing tenure. It would appear he argues
for a continuation of a colonial ruling that will maintain this assumption
of a settled and unified Australia and only allow Indigenous peoples
subordinate recognition at best (Connor 2005: 202-7).
In the Wik case, as native title was in existence where common law
had not extinguished it, the threat native title presented to pastoral leases
and the productive future of sovereignty, was again dealt with through
Hegelian mediation. A new legislative binary was established that
opposed ‘real’ traditional lands to those that were ‘wash[ed] away by
“the tide of history”’ (Wik v Queensland: 183).
Povinelli notes the High Court was once again ‘at pains to clarify
the legal foundation of the modern settler nation in the emergent doctrine
between common law and Native title’ (1998: 18). Ensuring the passage
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through one self-referential legislation to the next, the court once again
agreed that when the common law and traditional law collided, the
British law ‘took seed in colonial soil, adapted to new material and
social conditions’ and became Australian law (Povinelli 1998: 19). The
court in Wik found:
[It] was not that the native title of Indigenous Australians was enforceable
of its own power or by legal techniques akin to the recognition of foreign
law. It was that such title was enforceable in Australian courts because the
common law in Australia said so (Wik v Queensland: 237-8).

This ‘said so’ power, paradigmatic for Hegel’s ‘power of
consciousness’, was utilised to mediate the threat of Indigenous title to
the pastoral territories of Australian sovereignty.
Again the separation of juridical and legislative law animated this
‘said so’ power to take both the inside and outside of the law in order
to determine the acceptable histories of authentic traditions from those
that sovereignty considered repugnant or dying out. In the Mabo case
it was determined:
When the tide of history has washed away any real acknowledgement of
traditional law ... the foundation of native title has disappeared. A native
title which has ceased ... cannot be revived for contemporary recognition
(Mabo v Queensland (No 2): 43).

So where the common law presumes resilience to any teleological
threat to its existence, Indigenous traditional law is deemed
extinguishable. Not only does this ruling cover over the power
mechanisms within sovereignty that effected the dispossession of the
Indigenous from their traditional lands in the first place, it represents
the Indigenous as self-evidently inferior and dying out. This
representation of Indigenous peoples becomes bound with museumlike ossification within the passage of the progressive narrative of
sovereign history. Yet this denies the co-existent and ongoing
constitutive relations between the Indigenous peoples and the rest of
the population. The ongoing lived-experience of the Indigenous peoples
can’t be represented as one ancient and congealed nation, as they have
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multiple lineages with different constituting circumstances, just as the
non-Indigenous have not constituted as one perpetually occidental
nation. Constituting circumstances of all individuals requires vigilant
reflection in order to discern situated historicity and ongoing power
relations that are negotiated inter-subjectively. The immense disaffection
from colonial interpenetration cannot be dismissed regarding present
constitutive circumstances. Neither should the privilege and power of
those enabled through dynamics of access be overlooked, along with
consideration of the institutions that consolidate and ensure political
and economic influence in the Australian situation.
I have argued that a homogenous identity of the sovereign nation
consolidates through a closed circle of self-privileging determinations,
while at the same time binding a congealed subordinate Indigenous
identity as sublated ‘other’. Bound as visible markers of cultural
difference, rendered subordinately other, Indigenous difference is
contradictorily profited from and required in decisions that consolidate
a unitary sovereignty. The naivety in this self-referential narrative is
the twofold blindness and silencing it produces in self and other, through
its reliance on visual objectification. The interdependence and coconstitution of inter-subjective relations is repeatedly overlooked.
In the practices of objectification, where the ‘power of
consciousness’ animates, recognition is contrived as primary cognition
— the spontaneous effect of the evidence of the visible (Bhabha 1994).
Yet visual perception can be a narrow and reductive cognisance that
harnesses instrumental reason in the attempt to assume a form of
preservation from alienating threats to the self. Kelly Oliver writes:
The phrase seeing is believing takes on new meaning if what we see is
influenced by what we believe. And experiencing what is eye-opening is
not necessarily a result of opening or closing our eyelids. What we recognise
and what we see are the result of much more than opening our eyes and
looking (Oliver 2001: 147).
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Seeing the difference
In Border Dialogues, Chambers (1990) writes of the revealed limits of
meaning in the post-colonial frame. If we look behind the repressive
masks of colonialism, we may see the arbitrariness of what can be
expressed at any one time, and how representation always blocks the
excess of its meaning. Language is the ever-present matrix from which
we draw out meanings to engage with, not objectively, as it is impossible
to fully comprehend the world, and impossible to fully comprehend
our subject-to-subject relations. Our social relations involve not a goal
but a conversation, tracing an endless passage. In engaging of our
differences and mobile relations we are drawing a limit across the
diverse possibilities of the world. The lack of a fixed referent or stable
foundation is what produces meaning. Our interpretations attempt to
confer sense, not to discover it.
For Oliver (2001), this aporetic passage that opens as the dialogic
space of meaning, is sketched in the inter-subjective relation of
witnessing. The sharing of meaning is produced in the space of tension
between the doubled relation of the positioning of the subject as
eyewitness, and the inter-subjective relation that bears witness to what
cannot be seen. The aporia becomes the third space of the inner witness,
breaking the binary between recogniser and recognisee. Oliver finds
that psychic survival depends on an addressable other, the inner witness.
If one’s subject position is the sociohistorical position which one finds
oneself, and one’s subjectivity is the structure of witnessing as infinite
responsibility, then the inner witness is where subject position and
subjectivity meet (Oliver 2001: 87).

The inner witness makes it possible to internalise meanings as our
sense of meaning comes through our relationships with others, beyond
and within. The inner witness is produced and sustained by dialogic
and non-linguistic communication with others. It must be in place for
a sense of agency, and makes experience meaningful as a sharing of
unique differences and related meaning, constituted through encounters
with otherness. So subjects are formed and sustained by address-ability
and response-ability.

280

Rites of passage?

Witnessing becomes a powerful alternative to recognition, as
subjectivity can be re-conceived as infinitely open to a system of
responding. It is also a matter of understanding the limits of recognition,
as it is impossible to fully recognise the truth of other, as well as the
truth for oneself. The aporetic relation of ethos offers the recognition
that we are responsible for the other, while also a responsibility of the
other. Prising open the blind spot of Hegelian denial, Bataille’s
excoriated eye exposes the limits of determined meaning, along with
(in)finite responsibility in our relations with others.

Psuedo-transgression
Considering the relations of address-ability and respons-ability in the
ongoing production of meaning, sovereign practices of objectification
continue to utilise representations of subordinate ‘other’ and deny
negotiating relations with Indigenous peoples. This dominating
structuration compromises ongoing address-ability and response-ability.
Crucial to this argument, though I don’t have space to elaborate on this
here, is the impact colonialism has had on the ensured vitality and
access to the Indigenous people’s own languages. Aside from being
cut off from their own culturally invigorating languages, the opportunity
for the Stolen Generations to give testimonies was clearly a painful
process of witnessing to what was impossible to articulate. To suffering
that is beyond any adequate expression. The truth of suffering cannot
be reduced to historical facts. Explaining anguish is impossible. It cannot
be described. It must be experienced. Oliver alerts us to the fact that
subject positions and subjectivity emerge in our responsive relations
with each other and when we relate to subjects we relate to their situated
historicity and socio/political positioning.
I want to distinguish this impossibility for fully recognising
suffering from an ‘unrecognition’ that emerges with the repression of
denial, as in the blind spot of Australian legislation. Trish Luker (2005),
in an insightful paper on collective amnesia in postcolonial Australia
writes of a ‘willed’ forgetting at the level of national selfhood that
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emerges with the denial of facing collective responsibility to the Stolen
Generations. She states:
[T]the trauma which has characterised the response to the testimonies of
the Stolen Generations eclipses the pain of the Indigenous other,
appropriating the discourse of trauma and inducing the comfort of selective
amnesia (Luker 2005: 76).

So Hegelian sovereignty in Australian common law continues to
turn against responsibility, through what can be termed pseudotransgression. In the Hegelian passage, determinations stay in a closed
circle of self-reference, where the responsibility to the other is denied.
Bhabha calls this a ‘dangerous reduction of the spiral of différance’.
Racial and cultural otherness does not complete the circle, but circulates
and proliferates in the world in this spiral of différance (Bhabha 1994).
To be irresponsible is what Lévinas describes as a defacing of the other
‘like any other plastic form, eliminating the signification of the
responsibility with which its strangeness encumbers me’ (Lévinas 2001:
48-9). Remaining paternalistic and constraining Indigenous
communities into a bound and inferior identity sustains the naïve and
servile passage of self-referential determinations, harnessing relations
through instrumental Reason.

The bridge
If modelled within a binary of subordinate recognisee to dominant
recogniser, acknowledging Indigenous difference will remain derivative
at best, perpetually congealed in hierarchies and oppositions. To retain
stereotyped images of subordinate indigeneity, based on prior norms
of primitive other, with legislation that maintains this oppression, is a
dismissing, not an opportunity to recognise our inter-subjective
relatedness and the impossibility of fully recognising difference. It does
not allow for negotiative relations with cultural difference in the shared
creation of meaning.
Michael Dodson writes:
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When we talk about an Aboriginality based on the past of our peoples, we
are not talking about fabricating an identity based on a past we have
rediscovered or dug up; rather, we, the Aboriginal peoples, are already
retelling our past. Our memories are not chemicals in our heads, but our
flesh and our voices and our ways of seeing ... we re-create Aboriginality
in the context of all our experiences, including our pre-colonial practices,
our oppression and our political struggles. It is only a narrowness of vision,
or a misconception of culture as a frozen state, which leads people to limit
expressions of essential Aboriginality to the stereotyped (Dodson 2003:
40).

Responsiveness to each other and our differences requires a dispersal
of the logic of otherness as merely counterpoint to homogenous identity.
It is where poststructuralists propose to deconstruct the subject/object
dichotomy. The third space of intervention in this binary is the
enunciative emergence of translation, where a sharing of meaning takes
place. The ‘disruptive temporality of enunciation displaces the narrative’
of entrenched colonialism (Bhabha 1994: 37).
Sovereign determinations have been made within an appropriative
subject/object binary that renders the Indigenous as perpetually ‘other’.
Yet the sovereign is not one. As Motha argues, iterating with Nancy in
The Failure in Postcolonial Sovereignty in Australia (Motha 2005: 11319), the impossibility of an individual being alone does not result in
the impossibility of a singular being, rather singularity implies the
plurality of singular beings. As finite subjects the ‘I’ cannot reveal its
own finitude, it cannot say ‘I am finite’. ‘Being with’ is the community
that experiences the finitude of its members, alongside one another,
sharing the recognition that there is nothing recognisable. ‘Being with’
is neither the assertion of a limit between communities nor an absolute
community. In sharing the knowledge of the limit, finitude can only
take place as community. Being finite is always already being in
common. To follow Nancy, the full articulation of the co-appearance
of community is the unpresentable ‘par excellence’. This calls into
question the assumed fixity of identity and sovereignty.
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Heidegger’s irreducible concept of ‘coming into the clearing’
suggests the movement through meaning as it precedes and exceeds
us. Dialogically, at the enunciative borders, where the ensured relation
to Reason becomes disrupted beyond sense, the inter-subjective relation
of ethos emerges. I hope to finish iteratively with Bhabha, who iterates
with Heidegger,
It is in this sense that the boundary becomes the place from which something
begins its presencing in a movement not dissimilar to ambivalent articulation
of the beyond ... Always and ever differently the bridge escorts the lingering
and hastening ways of men [and women] to and fro, so that they may get to
other banks ... The bridge that gathers as a passage that crosses (Bhabha
1994: 5).

Note
1

I am indebted to my anonymous referees and Dr John Lechte and Dr Stewart
Motha for their insightful comments on this article.
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